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This position paper discusses two related questions:
1. Using the framework of network economics, what are
success factors behind the adoption of Bitcoin (a cryp-
tographic curreny), and can we copy them for other
protocols?
2. Can we design more successful protocols if we have in-
band payment mechanisms to internalize the external-
ities that emerge during adoption and in steady state?
1. INTRODUCTION
The history of the Internet has unleashed unmeasurable
engineering eort into the design of new protocols. However,
perceived usefulness, as measurable by counting features or
gauging elegant design, has not always been a good predictor
for adoption. The search for explanations has led to RFC
5218 [10], a comprehensive list of success factors along with
case studies of successful protocols. Many of these success
factors can as well be framed in the language of network eco-
nomics [4]. This enables us to seek for solution approaches
in this discipline towards the vision of considering the eco-
nomics of new Internet protocols already at the design stage.
This position paper in particular presents thoughts in-
spired by the recent success of Bitcoin, a cryptographic cur-
rency system. Section 2 recalls the fundamentals by intro-
ducing terminology and pointing out selected economic bar-
riers to protocol adoption in general. It also explains Bitcoin
to the extent necessary. Section 3 analyses success factors
of Bitcoin and comments on their applicability to other pro-
tocols. It turns out that important success factors are tied
to the nature of Bitcoin as a payment system. This leads
to the discussion in Section 4, which concentrates on means
of internalizing externalities by protocol design and explores
the idea of built-in payment systems. Finally, Section 5 con-
cludes with open problems and items for a research agenda.
2. BACKGROUND
This section is intended to set the stage by recalling ba-
sic notions of network economics and by introducing salient
features of Bitcoin. Readers familiar with one or the other
topic are safe to skip the respective sections.
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2.1 Network Economics
Network externalities
In simple terms, a large part of economics studies the actions
of autonomous decision makers (called agents) who each seek
to maximize their own objective function (called utility).
Externalities arise if the action taken by one agent aects
the objective function of other agents. Network externalities
are a special kind of externality. Each agent's action space
can be partitioned into actions that involve participation in
a specic network and actions that do not. The objective
function of any agent i who participates in the network has
strictly greater utility if any other agent j participates in the
network as well. This justies statements such as\the value
of the network is super-linear in the number of its users".
(See [3] for a discussion of the shape of the functional form.)
Adoption decision
At our level of abstraction, participating in a network is
equivalent to adopting a (compatible) protocol. Each agent
i adopts if his individual benet of adoption exceeds his indi-
vidual cost of adoption. RFC 5218 lists this as basic success
factor called positive net value. However, in the presence
of network externalities, the benet depends on the number
of other agents who adopt. Let q 2 [0;1] be the fraction of
agents who adopt. If each individual agent's benet is below
the cost as long as q is small, we face a social coordination
problem. No agent is willing to adopt alone but all agents
could benet if they collectively agreed to adopt.
Incremental deployability, another success factor in RFC
5218, can be interpreted as a requirement for the benet to
be signicant even if q is small. The other basic success fac-
tors in RFC 5218, including open code availability, freedom
from usage restrictions, open specication availability, and
open maintenance processes, are means of reducing the cost
of adoption for all agents, thereby facilitating solutions to
the social coordination problem.
Business interests may diverge from this objective. Mar-
ket power permitting, prot-maximizing providers strive to
support smaller networks than socially optimal [4]. Arti-
cial barriers to adoption through pricing, obscurity, and
property rights are strategic tools towards this end [12].
Timing and uncertainty
Enter time. Costs and benets inuencing the adoption de-
cision do not always materialize at the same point in time.Chiey, switching costs are one-o costs incurred at the time
of adoption, e.g., the time spent to implement and upgrade
systems; or, for user-facing systems, the opportunity cost
of starting low on the learning curve. Switching costs are
often sunk, which means that they are not recoverable af-
ter a plan change. Likewise, they arise anew when the next
protocol adoption is due. Benets typically materialize over
time and may grow in the presence of network externalities
as other agents adopt sequentially. Misalignment in the tim-
ing of costs and benets complicates the adoption decision
because costs need to amortize over time.
With time comes uncertainty. When operating under un-
certainty, agents must anticipate future costs and benets,
typically by treating them as random variables and taking
expectations. Since there is always a small chance that a fu-
ture transfer of wealth will not happen (or will not aect the
agent anymore) because the state of the world has changed,
it is reasonable to discount more distant costs and benets
exponentially over time. Uncertainty adds even more com-
plications if agents are risk averse, meaning that they prefer
a smaller prot with certainty over a higher expected prot
under uncertainty. Even if agents are risk neutral, they may
prefer to delay an adoption decision in order to improve their
information about the likely realization of critical random
variables. For example, they might wait and see how many
other agents adopt a certain protocol; again, leading to a
deadlock if all agents follow this strategy.
Transition versus steady state
Network externalities, timing of individual adoption deci-
sions, and uncertainty can explain why the fact that a pro-
tocol is viable in steady state does not necessarily imply that
there exists a transition path of adoption decisions leading
to this state. In particular when regarding a succession of
incremental innovations, there exists a minimum innovation
threshold below which the relative advantage of the new pro-
tocol over the incumbent does not amortize the switching
cost. This can cause protocols to fail even if they are tech-
nically superior to the incumbent. Examples of this phe-
nomenon are plentiful.
Failure to reach the innovation threshold lets us rethink
the very notion of failure. In fact, this kind of failure can
be socially desirable if skipping an upgrade keeps a lower
threshold for the adoption of the next incremental innova-
tion that would not have met the higher bar. This observa-
tion dates back at least to work in the 1960s by Rogers [11],
author of a sociology textbook on diusion of innovations.
(While diusion is a broader concept spanning information
ows, awareness and persuasion of people, it encompasses
the stylized economic adoption decision in its core.)
The economists who studied network externalities in the
1980s added that the relative advantage depends on the
number of adopters, leading to notions of critical mass (for
the value of q at the tipping point) and game-theoretic mod-
els of possible interventions that solve the bootstrapping
problem. Ozment and Schechter [9] have summarized these
results for the case of security protocols including a case
study on the adoption of DNSSEC.
Network topology and risk
Non-trivial graphical topologies underlying a network of ex-
ternalities add substantial complexity and emergent features.
The traditional \macro" view on network externalities im-
plicitly assumes a fully connected graph between all partici-
pating agents: Metcalfe's law postulates that the value of a
network of compatible communication devices is quadratic
in the number of subscribers. This presumes that every po-
tential communication relation adds the same unit of value.
However, the objective functions of real agents are less sym-
metric, suggesting to model externalities on graphs. With
real topologies hard to observe and even harder to tract,
special classes of graphs (trees, bipartite, etc.) can be of
interest to study typical phenomena. For example, the no-
tion of indirect network externalities [5], where utility does
not depend on the number of agents participating in the
same but in a specic reference network, can be framed as
feature of topology. (Think of complementary goods, such
as payment system adoption depending on the number of
merchants accepting it.)
Network topology is also important when externalities are
negative, such as the propagation of risk between interde-
pendent agents. Consideration of risk is a relatively young
avenue in network economics [1], but the recent awareness of
security in cyberspace may make it a more relevant success
factor for the adoption of Internet protocols than ever.
2.2 Bitcoin
Bitcoin is a serious attempt to establish a global cryp-
tographic currency in a fully decentralized manner. The
concept was rst described in a white paper published un-
der pseudonym [8] and is now being developed by an open
source community. The core of the Bitcoin system consists
of a protocol, specied by reference implementation, and
a global state stored in a distributed data structure called
block chain.
Protocol
Technically, Bitcoin is a distributed peer-to-peer accounting
system where account numbers are public keys. Account
ownership is dened by knowledge of the private keys, which
are used to sign transactions. Bitcoin uses majority consen-
sus to enforce integrity such that the global state satises
two constraints:
1. a non-negativity constraint for every account, thus pre-
venting double-spending; and
2. an accounting identity for the sum of all account bal-
ances, thus ensuring conservation of value.
The latter distinguishes Bitcoin from earlier proposal of cryp-
tographic cash. Replication ensures availability of the sys-
tem state with high probability. A proof-of-work scheme
discourages sybil attacks against the consensus mechanism.
The protocol entangles the proof-of-work defense with an
(approximately) incentive-compatible bootstrapping mech-
anism that regulates the initial distribution of wealth. This
is known as mining process: solving cryptographic puzzles
is rewarded with units of the virtual currency.
Ecosystem
Over the past two years, a vibrant ecosystem has developed
around the Bitcoin core including merchants, exchanges,
mining pools, remote wallets, and casinos. At the time of
writing (late August 2013), blockchain.info, a statistical ser-
vice, reports 11.5 million bitcoin in circulation, each trading
for a market price of 125 US$, leading to an overall mar-
ket capitalization of 1.5 billion US$. The Bitcoin networkrecords 50.000 transactions per day accumulating to a global
state of 9 gigabyte. The computational eort spent on the
proof-of-work puzzles is in the order of 500 terrahash per
second. For comparison, a heavily cooled Intel Xeon CPU
reaches up to 50 megahash per second and some GPUs are
in the order of a few gigahash per second.
Bitcoin's success is somewhat surprising because it has
established cryptographic payments against the backdrop of
many failed attempts to launch forms of electronic cash in
the 1990s and 2000s, awkward economics against dominant
incumbents (chiey PayPal and credit cards), speculative at-
tacks and hitches at key players in the ecosystem (e.g., pop-
ular exchanges), adverse press and associations with crime
(often justied), and therefore credible threats of govern-
ment intervention with the potential of nullifying all de-
posits. In sum, it is probably fair to state that Bitcoin's
starting position was much more dicult than the one of
many Internet protocols. Yet it throve, and still survives.
3. BITCOIN AS A MODEL
What can we learn from Bitcoin? Clearly, the protocol
design heeds all success factors recommended in RFC 5218.
This is a starting point, but not always sucient. In par-
ticular payment systems are subject to indirect network ex-
ternalities where a critical mass of merchants has to accept
a means of payment until buyers adopt; likewise merchants
could wait until enough buyers are willing to pay with the
new system. Solving this social coordination problem (or
at least reaching critical mass) by means of a mandate was
not an option for Bitcoin. The position of incumbents (es-
sentially the whole established payments industry) is very
strong and the sector as a whole is heavily regulated. As a re-
sult, mandates in favor of an unknown crypto currency were
extremely unlikely. Quite the contrary: even progressive
technology activists, such as the Electronic Frontier Foun-
dation, explicitly dissociated themselves from Bitcoin.
In these circumstances, Bitcoin's strength arguably lasts
on three factors. First, the built-in reward system for early
adoptors. By contributing to the distributed transaction au-
thentication, miners earn a predened amount of bitcoins.
This reward declines slowly and exponentially over time,
which indicates its purposeful design as a bootstrapping ve-
hicle. What is more, the diculty of the mining puzzles is
adjusted in a shorter control loop depending on the available
network hash rate. Consequently, the probability of secur-
ing the xed reward is indirectly proportional to the number
of participants. This is a smart way to oset the barrier of
entry imposed by network externalities. The author is not
aware of any other protocol using this approach.
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The second success factor is not primarily in the proto-
col, but in the ecosystem. Observe that bootstrapping is
inhibited by predominantly indirect network externalities
whereas the reward mechanism is designed to oset direct
network externalities. Bridges can be found in the ecosystem
where third parties oer their services to exchange between
bitcoin and conventional currencies. This allows early adop-
tors to interface with merchants accepting the incumbent
payment networks. In other words, exchanges are institu-
tions that convert indirect into direct network externalities.
(Why direct? Because exchange fees and trading risk are
1The author appreciates relevant pointers by the workshop
participants.
indirect proportional to liquidity and thus decrease with a
growing number of Bitcoin adopters.) In the language of
network economics, exchanges serve as adapters which in-
terface between two otherwise incompatible networks [4].
The third success factor lies in the interpretation of Bit-
coin as money. Among other functions, money serves as
store of value and thereby solves the inter-temporal match-
ing problem in an exchange economy. Early adoptors are
rewarded with the promise to exchange their bitcoins for
something they desire at a future point in time. Trusting
this promise, they may tolerate a limited number of mer-
chants at the time of adoption in expectation of ongoing
uptake by a wider set of market participants. Of course this
is nothing else than speculating on the success of Bitcoin,
which is a self-fullling prophecy; in particular if markets
are incomplete so that building a short position on Bitcoin
(i.e., speculating against it) involves high transaction costs.
So can we take Bitcoin's success as a model for other Inter-
net protocols? Granted, few Internet protocols will have as
dicult a starting position as Bitcoin. Those that strug-
gle to get adopted nonetheless can take inspiration from
Bitcoin's rst two success factors, namely a built-in reward
mechanism and an ecosystem providing adapters. The third
success factor seems to be specic to protocols that create
lasting virtual value (or comes with such a promise). This
factor is not easily transferrable to arbitrary protocols.
4. BITCOIN AS ENABLER
If we cannot copy all of Bitcoin's success factors, can we
at least use Bitcoin (or similar payment systems) to solve
incentive issues in the design of other Internet protocols?
Indeed, the canonical response to externalities in economics
is to internalize them. This involves a transfer of value from
agent j, who benets from agent i's action, to agent i; or vice
versa if agent i's action causes a loss for agent j. Typical net-
work protocols lack the means for arranging such transfers.
This constrains the design space of protocols to a mixture
of self-enforcing, win-win, or dependence on altruistic action
(i.e., some nodes absorb negative externalities).
In fact, many of the popular Internet protocols require
that the systems implementing the protocols do not always
operate in their owner's best interest. Of course, if large im-
balances in the distribution of benets and costs accumulate,
the issue may be escalated to out-of-band mechanisms, such
as the negotiation table. The debate on network neutrality is
a vivid example, illustrating how hard it is to bargain a fair
solution. With weak Internet governance and strong vested
interests, a possible way forward is to provide means for in-
ternalizing the externalities right in the protocol design. We
shall briey explore three options.
Paying with money
Paying with money is typically out-of-band, informal, and
in bulk volumes to keep the transaction costs low. As a
consequence, this method requires a contractual relation-
ship between identied legal entities, trusted metering and
audits. And it locks out small players who cannot amortize
the upfront cost to establish such relationships. Paying with
money in-band is conceivable, but impractical. This is due
to prohibitively high transaction costs of micro-payments.
Piggybacking on a system like Bitcoin is a new avenue to
explore. Possible caveats are computational overhead and
latency of Bitcoin transactions as well as new security risksas protocol stacks will need to know the private key, the
digital counterpart of a blank check.
Paying with data
Some Internet services { think of them as informal proto-
cols on the application layer { try to internalize externali-
ties vis-a-vis end users by collecting and monetizing personal
data. The typical exploitation strategy is to sell targeted
ads. However, personal data is a very inconvenient unit of
account. Personal data has all the disadvantages of informa-
tion goods, it is subject to specic and complicated privacy
laws, and it is very hard to measure the value of individ-
ual data points, which can be extremely volatile [2]. The
law of large numbers tells us that only big organizations can
balance the risk of receiving good and bad data points and
extract benets from a pool of personal data close to the
(more predictable) average value. Moreover, paying with
data is clearly not an option for protocols on lower layers.
Protocols with built-in payment systems
If our protocols could readily use direct value transfers be-
tween agents (such as money) instead of unwieldy substi-
tutes (such as personal data or out-of-band settlements), it
would be much easier to design incentive-compatible as well
as privacy-friendly protocols and services. This suggests to
design protocols with built-in payment systems, each light-
weight and tailored to the purpose of the protocol. Re-
searchers of peer-to-peer networks have made some steps in
this direction to discourage free riders (a special form of
externality) [6]. But is seems that more general classes of
protocols can benet from built-in payment systems. These
systems can reward early adoptors and internalize the ex-
ternalities that emerge during operation alike. As more pro-
tocols with payment systems emerge, third parties can oer
exchange services between dierent protocol currencies. An
advantage of clearing in a specic currency rather than in
bitcoin or dollar is that security and privacy measures can be
tailored to the application, making it harder to loot nodes
or launder money, but admittedly not impossible. Recall
that many protocols do not have eective defenses against
malicious resource consumption (denial of service) and rely
on monitoring and detection to prevent abuse.
Note that it will not always be easy to exactly quantify
an externality. Instead, we have to devise approximations,
possibly rened with feedback loops or simple market mech-
anisms for adjustment at runtime. Research on approximate
mechanism design can help to gauge how close we can get.
5. OUTLOOK
We have explained critical success factors for protocol
adoption in terms of network economics. The most salient
feature of the Bitcoin protocol is its reward mechanism for
early adoptors. Although not all ingredients of Bitcoin's suc-
cess generalize to arbitrary protocols, having built-in pay-
ment systems could substantially widen the design space for
easily adoptable protocols. Payments enable mechanism to
internalize the externalities that emerge during the transi-
tion phase as well as in steady state.
Protocols with built-in payment systems call for a larger
research agenda. Technically, how can payment functional-
ity be built in a reusable manner so that protocol design-
ers, who are not necessarily specialists in payment systems
security and privacy, can easily embed them in their proto-
cols? How to standardize mechanism designs? How to se-
cure funds in the protocol stack through system events such
as virtualization, cloning, or reboot after a crash? What
about regulatory implications such as taxation, nancial reg-
ulation, and law enforcement?
Besides the idea of built-in payment systems, there are
open research questions on protocol adoption. For exam-
ple, can we empirically validate and rank the importance of
the success factors in RFC 5218? If altruism was an impor-
tant driver of early Internet development, whether and why
did it disappear? Is this primarily related to scale (leaving
more money on the table is less tolerable), intensied com-
petition (every cent counts), or better information (knowing
how much my partner takes away makes me eager to get my
share)? Technical records of protocol adoption, if available,
can be valuable resources for interdisciplinary research.
A nal remark concerns the hypothesis that Bitcoin's sub-
versive nature is a success factor in itself, an argument that
can also be made for systems like Tor or BitTorrent. We have
no evidence to tell whether a fraction of Bitcoin adopters
with illicit goals { chiey money laundering [7] { had just
no alternative and thus brought the critical mass to unleash
sustained adoption. If there is some truth in it, this is cer-
tainly a factor that should not make it into an RFC.
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